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Comment
LET THEM TRAIN: WHY THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT’S
DECISION TO STAY THE INJUNCTION OF THE 2011 NFL
LOCKOUT WAS INCORRECT
AARON A. SPACONE
Although the 2011 National Football League (“NFL”) lockout did not
result in any cancelled regular season games, nor did it damage the
players, stadium employees, and small business owners to the extent that it
could have, there are still important lessons to be learned. This Comment
provides background on the NFL’s labor history, both in the court system
and in the negotiation room. Further, this Comment analyzes the
application of American labor law to the then-pending NFL lockout. This
Comment concludes with the argument that the principles of labor law and
public policy discussed herein should not have allowed the owners to lock
out the players.
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LET THEM TRAIN: WHY THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT’S
DECISION TO STAY THE INJUNCTION OF THE 2011 NFL
LOCKOUT WAS INCORRECT
AARON A. SPACONE
I. INTRODUCTION
The history of the relationship between the National Football League
(“NFL” or “League”) and its players has been a rocky one at best. One
reason for this tenuous relationship is the fact that the owners and players
treat themselves as employers and employees, and that the courts have
followed their lead. Owners have players sign the same contracts with the
same language as everyday people. Yet, unlike the average American,
NFL players are televised nationally every Sunday in the fall season.
Another not-so-subtle difference between an NFL player and an average
American is that the median NFL salary was $770,000 in 2011,1 while the
median household income in the United States was $50,673 in December
2011.2 Nevertheless, the same labor laws that govern the work life of the
average American govern the work life of the average NFL athlete.
It is with that understanding that this Comment, and the case of Brady
v. National Football League,3 takes its shape. The truth is that while
professional football players may fall under the same general concept of
jurisdiction and adjudication as the rest of us, there are nevertheless
reasons why a labor issue between the players and their employers is
unique. When the NFL imposed a lockout of the players and jeopardized
the 2011 season, it was not only the players, but also the coaches, trainers,
television networks, stadium and concession workers, along with
neighborhood bar and restaurant owners who faced the possibility of
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1
The
Average
NFL
Player,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Jan.
27,
2011,
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/11_06/b4214058615722.htm. In fact, the average
NFL salary is even higher at $1.9 million. Id.
2
GORDON GREEN & JOHN CODER, SENTIER RESEARCH, HOUSEHOLD INCOME TRENDS: JANUARY
2012 2 (2012), available at http://www.sentierresearch.com/reports/Sentier_Research_Household_Inco
me_Trends_Report_January_2012_12_03_01.pdf.
3
Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 644 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2011).
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serious revenue loss. The owners’ imposition of a lockout on the players,
in an effort to maximize their already high revenue stream, showed a
conscious disregard for the number of people who rely on the NFL season.
The improper conduct of the owners, however, is not the subject of this
Comment. Instead, the discussion here will primarily focus on the four
decisions made by federal courts on the legality of the lockout imposed by
the League: two by the District Court for the District of Minnesota, and
two by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.5 The
district court decisions favored the players, granting their request for a
preliminary injunction of the lockout and denying the League’s motion for
a stay pending appeal. The Eighth Circuit decisions overturned the district
court holdings and granted the stay pending appeal on the theory that the
district court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin a lockout under the NorrisLaGuardia Act.6
This Comment will examine the history of the legal and footballbusiness-related issues between the League and the players to create a
frame of reference for an analysis of why the Eighth Circuit’s decision was
incorrect. This Comment will be split into four parts: Part II will relate the
history of labor relations between the NFL and its players; Part III will
examine the most recent non-legal and football-related issues that led to
the 2011 lockout; Part IV will discuss the federal courts’ involvement in
standard labor issues over the years; and Part V will discuss how the
Eighth Circuit erred in Brady.
4

II. A HISTORY OF LABOR RELATIONS BETWEEN
THE NFL AND ITS PLAYERS
Before analyzing the decisions made by the federal courts in Brady v.
National Football League,7 it is necessary to obtain a fundamental
understanding of the tenuous and complex history of labor relations
between the NFL and its players. This Part will lay the foundation for my
discussion of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, specifically with respect to why
the NFL should not have been able to lock out the players after the players
4
See Lou Dubois, What an NFL Lockout Would Mean to Small Businesses, INC. (Mar. 3, 2011),
http://www.inc.com/articles/201103/what-an-nfl-lockout-would-mean-to-small-business.html (“[E]very
city with an NFL franchise stands to lose about $160 million in revenue ($20 million per home game),
$5 billion total, and an aggregate of 115,000 jobs.”). The mayor of Buffalo, one of the League’s
smallest markets, is also on record as saying that a season-long lockout would cost the city $140
million. Id.
5
Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 779 F. Supp. 2d 992 (D. Minn.) [hereinafter Brady I]; Brady v.
Nat’l Football League, 779 F. Supp. 2d 1043 (D. Minn. 2011) [hereinafter Brady II]; Brady v. Nat’l
Football League, 640 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2011) (per curium) [hereinafter Brady III]; Brady v. Nat’l
Football League, 644 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2011) [hereinafter Brady IV].
6
Brady III, 640 F.3d at 792.
7
779 F. Supp. 2d 992 (D. Minn. 2011).
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decertified the union and decided to forfeit the protections of labor laws.
The first case relevant to Brady was Mackey v. National Football
League.8 In Mackey, the players challenged Commissioner Pete Rozelle’s
restriction of player movement between NFL clubs, known as the “Rozelle
Rule,” as a violation of the Sherman Act.9 The League claimed that the
Rule was protected from antitrust regulation under the non-statutory labor
exemption, which serves to “insulate legitimate collective activity by
employees, which is inherently anticompetitive but is favored by federal
labor policy.”10 In affirming the district court’s decision that the Rozelle
Rule was a per se violation of antitrust laws,11 the Eighth Circuit used a
three-part test to determine that the Rozelle Rule did not fall under the nonstatutory labor exemption and was thus vulnerable to antitrust scrutiny.12
This victory for the players in Mackey did not last long, however, as the
League ostensibly exchanged the Rozelle Rule for other provisions that
could not be attacked in antitrust litigation.13
The next major antitrust disputes to emerge between the League and
the players came in the Powell/McNeil line of cases.14 Powell v. National
Football League15 focused on veteran free agency, and specifically whether
players have a right to bring suit under the Sherman Act at the point of a
bargaining impasse.16 In Powell, the district court used the Mackey
decision to determine that the League was open to a lawsuit at a bargaining
impasse, but the Eighth Circuit rejected the district court’s rationale that a
bargaining impasse triggered the application of the antitrust laws.17
Instead, the Eighth Circuit held that, even though the collective bargaining
agreement had expired and the parties were at impasse, management was

8

543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 609.
10
Id. at 611.
11
Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 407 F. Supp. 1000, 1007 (D. Minn. 1975).
12
See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614 (“We find the proper accommodation to be: First, the labor policy
favoring collective bargaining may potentially be given pre-eminence over the antitrust laws where the
restraint on trade primarily affects only the parties to the collective bargaining relationship. Second,
federal labor policy is implicated sufficiently to prevail only where the agreement sought to be
exempted concerns a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. Finally, the policy favoring collective
bargaining is furthered to the degree necessary to override the antitrust laws only where the agreement
sought to be exempted is the product of bona fide arm’s-length bargaining.” (citations omitted)). The
district court in Brady II outlined the same test for exemption by quoting the Mackey opinion. Brady
II, 779 F. Supp. 2d 992, 998 (D. Minn. 2011). The Eighth Circuit was satisfied with the first two
prongs of the test, but found that the Rozelle Rule restricting free agency was not the product of the
League’s bona fide arm’s-length bargaining. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615–16.
13
See Brady I, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 1000 (discussing the “Plan B” restraints on players).
14
Id. at 999.
15
930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989).
16
Id. at 1295–96.
17
Id. at 1301.
9
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protected from judicial intervention.
On appeal, the court noted that
labor policy favors negotiation and settlements, rather than judicial
intervention, and it declined to limit the applicability of the labor
exemption.19 While the ruling was unfavorable to the players, the Eighth
Circuit did note the League’s concession that the Sherman Act could be
applicable in certain situations, specifically “if the affected employees
ceased to be represented by a certified union.”20
It was in the Powell line of cases that the courts made their first
explicit reference to the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The Norris-LaGuardia Act
is discussed further herein,21 but the district court used the NorrisLaGuardia Act as a frame of reference for the non-statutory labor
exemption in a separate Powell decision, holding—in line with the Eighth
Circuit—that a bargaining impasse is not the equivalent of the end of a
labor dispute, and thus does not preclude the Norris-LaGuardia Act from
prohibiting an injunction in cases “involving or growing out of labor
disputes.”22 In essence, the Norris-LaGuardia Act strips federal courts of
the authority to enjoin labor disputes or disputes growing out of a labor
relationship. The Powell cases refused to set guidelines as to when there is
no labor relationship, but they nonetheless illustrate that a mere bargaining
impasse is not enough to preclude the application of the Act and to trigger
the involvement of the federal courts.23
Following the Mackey decision, the players chose to disclaim the union
and bring suit against the League, alleging that a new system of player
restraints (known as “Plan B” restraints) constituted an antitrust violation
in another Powell v. National Football League decision.24 The League
reasserted the non-statutory labor exemption, but the argument was
rejected on summary judgment because, without a union, no “ongoing

18
See id. at 1302 (“Both relevant case law and the more persuasive commentators establish that
labor law provides a comprehensive array of remedies to management and union, even after
impasse. . . . We are influenced by those commentators who suggest that, given the array of remedies
available to management and unions after impasse, a dispute such as the one before us ‘ought to be
resolved free of intervention by the courts’ . . . .” (citing J. Weistart & C. Lowell, The Law of Sports
§ 5.06, at 590 (1979))); see also id. (“A rule withdrawing immunity because the previous contract
expired before a new agreement was reached is contrary to national labor law. The parties would be
forced to enter into a collective bargaining agreement to avoid antitrust sactions [sic], when labor law is
opposed to any such requirement.” (quoting Robert C. Berry & William B. Gould, A Long Deep Drive
to Collective Bargaining: Of Players, Owners, Brawls, and Strikes, 31 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 685, 774
(1981))).
19
Id. at 1303.
20
Id. at 1303 n.12.
21
See infra Part III.B.
22
Powell v. Nat’l Football League, 690 F. Supp. 812, 814 (D. Minn. 1988).
23
Id. at 815 (“[W]here the bargaining relationship and the collective bargaining process remains
intact, a controversy regarding terms or conditions of employment constitutes a labor dispute.”).
24
764 F. Supp. 1351, 1353–54 (D. Minn. 1991).
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collective bargaining relationship” existed between the two parties. The
League also claimed that for the union to be officially dissolved, the
players would have to apply for and obtain decertification from the
National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”).26 The court ruled, however,
that as long as certification was not required for a union to participate in
collective bargaining, decertification was not required to end collective
bargaining.27 The court also recognized the limits of the requirement to
bargain in good faith, establishing that the union no longer has such a duty
when “a majority of the players have clearly indicated their wish not to be
represented by any entity . . . during collective bargaining.”28
Having satisfied the requirements for the dissolution of the union, the
Powell plaintiffs successfully moved for partial summary judgment to
strike the League’s claim that the non-statutory labor exemption still
applied.29 The court granted partial summary judgment against the labor
exemption defense, reasoning that the exemption no longer applied
because no remedies existed under labor law with specific reference to
collective bargaining, NLRB proceedings for failure to bargain in good
faith, and strikes.30 The district court eventually ruled against the summary
judgment motion in McNeil v. National Football League,31 a companion
case of Powell.32 The court labeled the motion premature, but the case
made it to a jury, where a verdict was returned that Plan B violated Section
1 of the Sherman Act and caused economic injury to the players.33 The
successful Powell judgment spurred a group of hopeful free agents to bring
legal action against the League for the same restraints in Jackson v.
National Football League.34 The court in Jackson based its holding on the
decisions in both Powell and McNeil, granting a temporary restraining
order because these individual players would suffer irreparable harm from
the League’s restraints.35
The decisions in McNeil and Jackson laid the groundwork for the
antitrust class action litigation in White v. National Football League36 in
25

25

Id. at 1358.
Id. at 1356.
27
Id. at 1358.
28
Id. at 1357–58 n.6.
29
Id. at 1359.
30
Id.
31
790 F. Supp. 871, 897 (D. Minn. 1992).
32
Judges and legal scholars often use McNeil to refer to the McNeil and Powell cases of 1991,
both of which went in front of the District Court for the District of Minnesota.
33
Brady I, 779 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1001–02 (D. Minn. 2011) (citing McNeil v. Nat’l Football
League, 1992 WL 315292, at *1 (D. Minn. Sept. 10, 1992) (publishing the special verdict form)).
34
Id. at 1002 (citing Jackson v. Nat’l Football League, 802 F. Supp. 226, 228 (D. Minn. 1992)).
35
Jackson v. Nat’l Football League, 802 F. Supp. 226, 230–31 (D. Minn. 1992).
36
822 F. Supp. 1389 (D. Minn. 1993).
26
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1993. In White, the players sought an injunction that would require total
or modified free agency.38 After the court certified a settlement class, the
League and the players entered into the White Stipulation and Settlement
Agreement (“SSA”), as well as a new collective bargaining agreement that
mirrored the SSA.39 The most important compromise of the SSA was that
the players were to recertify the union in exchange for the League agreeing
to waive any future right to assert the non-statutory labor exemption.40 The
end result of the White litigation was that the players reconstituted the
National Football League Players’ Association (“NFLPA”) as their
bargaining authority, and entered into a collective bargaining agreement
that mirrored the SSA.41
Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.42 presented an opportunity for the
Supreme Court to establish jurisprudence on the divergence between labor
and antitrust law.43 Having reached impasse in their negotiations with the
players’ union over developmental squad player salaries, the owners
decided to implement the terms of their “last best bargaining offer” without
the approval of the union.44 The union filed an antitrust suit, but the
Supreme Court held that this case fell under the “implicit antitrust
exemption” that the Court has used in the past, which was designed to
allow the collective-bargaining process to function properly.45 In its
opinion, the Supreme Court discussed the reasoning behind such an
exemption, better known as the “nonstatutory labor exemption,”46 noting
that it has historical and logical roots.47
Historically speaking, the non-statutory labor exemption was one way
of keeping judges from using antitrust law to resolve labor disputes, which
was deemed inappropriate.48 As decided in Local Union No. 189,
Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America v.
Jewel Tea Company,49 it is for Congress, not judges, to determine what

37
Brady I, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 1002 (citing White v. Nat’l Football League, 822 F. Supp. 1389 (D.
Minn. 1993)); see infra Part III (providing a more thorough discussion of labor dispute injunctions and
when they are appropriate).
38
White, 822 F. Supp. at 1395.
39
Brady I, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 1002.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
518 U.S. 231 (1996).
43
See id. at 233 (“The question in this case arises at the intersection of the Nation’s labor and
antitrust laws.”).
44
Id. at 234.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 235 (internal quotation marks omitted).
47
Id. at 236 (“This implicit exemption reflects both history and logic.”).
48
Id.
49
381 U.S. 676 (1965).
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constitutes reasonable practice in industrial conflicts.
With respect to
logic, the Court recognized the futility of a system of collective bargaining
where negotiators are forbidden from signing contracts that restrict
competition in any way.51 Thus, the only mechanism capable of
effectuating federal labor laws, while at the same time establishing
meaningful collective bargaining relationships between employers and
employees, became a non-statutory labor exemption that shielded the
parties from antitrust regulation.52
The Court eventually held that the actions of the owners were still
controlled by federal labor law, and by extension, the non-statutory labor
exemption. Despite reaching an impasse,53 the non-statutory labor
exemption applied because the owners’ conduct: (a) immediately followed
collective-bargaining negotiation; (b) grew out of and directly related to
the bargaining process; (c) dealt with a matter reserved for collective
bargaining; and (d) involved only the two parties to collective bargaining.54
The Court’s decision to apply the non-statutory labor exemption is
essentially its answer to the Powell decisions dealing with the duration of
the non-statutory exemption and the significance of a bargaining impasse.55
The Supreme Court made a similar ruling to that of the Eighth Circuit in
Powell, holding that an impasse in labor negotiations did not always
preclude antitrust intervention, notably in cases where an agreement among
employers is “sufficiently distant in time and in circumstances from the
collective-bargaining process.”56
The situation that developed and ended with a lockout in March 2011
began in 2008 when the NFL decided to opt out of the final two years of
the SSA and Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”), seeking a greater
share of revenues and the ability to impose new restraints on player
contracts.57 Attempts at structuring a deal in the years between 2008 and
50
See id. at 709 (“[T]his history shows a consistent congressional purpose to limit severely
judicial intervention in collective bargaining under cover of the wide umbrella of the antitrust laws,
and, rather, to deal with what Congress deemed to be specific abuses on the part of labor unions by
specific proscriptions in the labor statutes.”).
51
Brown, 518 U.S. at 237 (“As a matter of logic, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to require
groups of employers and employees to bargain together, but at the same time to forbid them to make
among themselves or with each other any of the competition-restricting agreements potentially
necessary to make the process work or its results mutually acceptable.”).
52
Id.
53
The government argued through an amici curiae brief that the “exemption should terminate at
the point of impasse.” Id. at 244. Termination of the exemption would allow the union to bring an
antitrust suit.
54
Id. at 250.
55
Brady I, 779 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1002 (D. Minn. 2011).
56
Brown, 518 U.S. at 250.
57
See Brady I, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 1003 (noting that the NFL wanted to impose restraints on the
“rookie wage scale”).
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2011 proved fruitless, and the NFL threatened to impose a lockout.58 By
the time the SSA and CBA were to expire on March 11, 2011, the players
had determined that it was in their best interest to decertify their union so
that the League presumably could not impose on them anticompetitive
restrictions free from antitrust scrutiny.59
The decertification of the players’ union brings us to the litigation that
will be thoroughly discussed in this Comment. Known as the “Brady
Plaintiffs,” a group of NFL players immediately filed a complaint alleging
antitrust violations under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, along with breach
of contract and tort claims.60 Relief was requested in the form of a
preliminary injunction that would enjoin all thirty-two teams from
perpetuating the lockout.61 The essence of the players’ claim was that the
teams (which are separately-owned and independently-operated) conspired
through a “price-fixing arrangement or a unilaterally-imposed set of
anticompetitive restrictions on player movement, free agency, and
competitive market freedom—to coerce the [p]layers to agree to a new
anticompetitive system of player restraints that will economically harm the
Plaintiffs.”62
Because the standard for a preliminary injunction is whether the
absence of an injunction is “likely” to lead to irreparable harm,63 the
burden was on the players to show that allowing the lockout to stand would
likely result in irreparable injury to them. The plaintiffs presented the
court with affidavits supporting this irreparable harm, focusing mainly on
the relatively short careers of NFL players, in an effort to prove that
damages would be an insufficient remedy.64 The players argued that
because of the pressure they face every day to prove themselves physically
and economically, the loss of an entire year in such a short professional
career could never be regained, and thus could not be compensated in
damages, as players’ careers could easily be shortened or end as a result of
58
Id. (defining a lockout as when an employer lays off its unionized employees while undergoing
a labor dispute to enhance its bargaining position (citing Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300,
301–02 (1965))).
59
Id. The players’ union, the NFLPA, informed the NFL the next day that they claimed no
interest in representing the players in negotiations. Id.
60
Id. at 1004.
61
Id. The players also used the term “group boycott” to describe the situation. Id.
62
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court also noted that the aim of the lockout was to
shut down the entire free agent market. Id.
63
See Winter v. Natura Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (holding that the possibility
standard of there being irreparable harm is too lenient, and that the standard should be one where
irreparable injury is likely (citing Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103 (1983))).
64
Brady I, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 1004 (noting that it would be difficult to assess the amount of
damages players deserved due to their unique skill-sets and because there was no competitive market to
use as a guide). The court also discussed the affidavits in more detail, and it noted how many of them
calculated the typical career of an NFL player to be less than four years, due to “the ever-present risk of
career-ending injury and the constant physical wear and tear on players’ bodies.” Id.
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the loss of a full season.
Before discussing the legal issues in depth, the district court in Brady I
acknowledged the low standard that has been applied in the past with
respect to the likelihood of irreparable harm. In 2008, the district court
held that lost playing time constituted irreparable harm. 66 In Powell, the
district court also held that NFL restrictions produced irreparable injury. 67
Using language adopted by the attorneys in the case at bar, the district
court held that “[t]he existence of irreparable injury is underscored by the
undisputed brevity and precariousness of the players’ careers in
professional sports, particularly in the NFL.”68 It was with those affidavits
and arguments in hand that the district court heard oral arguments on the
motion for a preliminary injunction.69
III. A DISCUSSION OF THE NON-LEGAL ISSUES OUT OF
WHICH THE 2011 LOCKOUT AROSE
This Part will discuss the non-legal issues that produced the tension
between the NFL and the players, leading to the March 2011 lockout. The
state of dissatisfaction amongst the owners began with the signing of a new
CBA in 2006. Paul Tagliabue, who was on his way out as NFL
commissioner at the time, lobbied ownership to accept the deal in an effort
to keep his legacy of labor peace intact.70 The deal eventually agreed to by
the owners71 contained a revenue-sharing provision that directed the
65

Id.
Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n v. Nat’l Football League, 598 F. Supp. 2d 971, 982–83 (D.
Minn. 2008) (extending a preliminary injunction issued as a temporary restraining order against arbitral
awards that upheld four-game suspensions for the use of banned substances in part because the players
were subject to irreparable harm).
67
Powell, 690 F. Supp. at 818 (refusing to impose injunctive relief for the unrestricted free
agency rules, but conceding that “at least some of the players are likely to sustain irreparable harm if
they are not immediately permitted to sign with other NFL clubs”).
68
Jackson, 802 F. Supp. at 231 (citing Linseman v. World Hockey Ass’n, 439 F. Supp. 1315,
1319 (D. Conn. 1977) (“[T]he career of a professional athlete is more limited than that of persons
engaged in almost any other occupation. Consequently the loss of even one year of playing time is
very detrimental.”)).
69
Brady I, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 1005.
70
See Jeffrey F. Levine & Bram A. Maravent, Fumbling Away the Season: Will the Expiration of
the NFL-NFLPA CBA Result in the Loss of the 2011 Season?, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 1419, 1428 (2010) (suggesting that Commissioner Tagliabue did not want his legacy tarnished
by retiring at a time of labor unrest); see also Michael Silver, Fans’ Guide to NFL Labor Battle,
YAHOO! SPORTS (Sept. 8, 2010), http://sports.yahoo.com/nfl/news?slug=ms-laborquestions090810
(detailing the involvement of Gene Upshaw, the NFLPA’s late executive director, who may have used
Tagliabue’s fear of leaving a tarnished legacy as leverage to get the players an even better share of the
revenue).
71
The deal was signed by thirty of thirty-two owners, with the owners of the Buffalo Bills and
Cincinnati Bengals dissenting. Jarrett Bell, NFL Owners Accept Player Union Proposal with 30-2
Vote, USA TODAY (Mar. 8, 2006, 4:43 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/200603-08-labor_x.htm.
66
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League’s top fifteen revenue producers to contribute to a fund to be
dispersed to the lower-revenue teams.72 The agreement also placed another
$850 million to $900 million of the owners’ money into the player revenue
pool, which was to run on a sliding scale based on the top fifteen teams in
non-television and ticket income.73 Based on that information alone, it is
clear why the 2011 lockout not only occurred, but why it was virtually
inevitable. This agreement was a dream scenario for the players, as it also
raised the salary cap from $85.5 million to $102 million, leaving more
money available for veterans and free agents.74
The question as to why a majority of the owners voted for this deal
was often asked during the negotiations phase and after the deal was
signed.75 Despite large amounts of money changing hands from the NFL’s
richest owners and moving down the line, this system of profit-sharing was
still seen as a better option than the possibility of an uncapped 2007 season
and a work stoppage in 2008.76 Perhaps the other owners should have
listened to Buffalo Bills owner Ralph Wilson, who “questioned whether
management acted too hastily without carefully deliberating its future
economic consequences.”77 In total, thirty owners signed a deal that gave
59.6% of total revenue to players’ salaries.78 On top of that, the new CBA
failed to address other areas of concern for the NFL, including the high
salaries for star players and veterans, and especially the escalating rookie
salary structure.79 With the new CBA not only failing to address these
areas of concern, but also actually allocating even more revenue for player
salaries,80 it is easy to see how the NFL became restless and discontented
with the agreement in the following years.

72
See id. (noting that the League’s top five teams would place the most money in the fund). The
seventeen lowest-revenue teams would not only not have to contribute to the player revenue pool, but
would also receive funds from the top fifteen earners, and yet two low-revenue teams (the Bills and the
Bengals) still voted against the deal. Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Levine & Maravent, supra note 70, at 1429. Wilson stated, “I didn’t understand [the revenue
sharing sections of the 2006 CBA] . . . it is a very complicated issue and I didn’t believe we should
[have] rush[ed] to vote in [forty-five] minutes.” Id. (alterations in original) (citing NFL Owners
Approve Six-Year CBA Extension, ESPN.COM (Mar. 8, 2006),
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2360258).
78
Silver, supra note 70.
79
Levine & Maravent, supra note 70, at 1428.
80
Id.
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IV. THE INVOLVEMENT OF FEDERAL COURTS
A. Procedural History
Before the dispute was settled out of court by a mediator, four
decisions were handed down by federal court judges—two by the District
Court for the District of Minnesota and two by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.81 On April 25, 2011, the district court
granted the motion for a preliminary injunction, holding that: (1) the
district court would not refer the issue of whether the players’ union
disclaimer was valid to the NLRB; (2) the disclaimer of the union was
effective; (3) the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not apply and thus the district
court was not precluded from issuing an injunction; (4) the players had
demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable harm if no injunction were issued;
(5) the players had a fair chance of succeeding on the merits of their claim;
and (6) public interest supported granting the motion for a preliminary
injunction.82 For the purposes of this Comment, I will focus on the
application of the Norris-LaGuardia Act as well as the public policy
concerns of both the district court and the Eighth Circuit.
Courts should pay “particular regard to the public consequences” in
employing the “extraordinary remedy” of preliminary injunction.83 Indeed,
the district court took that sentiment to heart in its opinion, determining
that policies of collective bargaining give way to antitrust policies that
favor competition as long as the decertification of the union is valid.84
When the court discussed the impact being felt by non-parties to the suit, it
was speaking of parties who feel a “tangible economic impact,” from
broadcasters down to individuals who run concession stands.85 The court
also noted a concededly non-economic “intangible interest” felt by fans of
professional football who have a “strong investment” in a season.86
On April 27, 2011, the same judge denied the defendant owners’
motion for a stay of the injunction, holding that: (1) the balance of equities
81
See supra note 5. The first case that came before the courts arose before the district court. As
discussed previously, the players sought a preliminary injunction on the League-imposed lockout. See
supra Part I.
82
Brady I, 779 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1042 (D. Minn. 2011).
83
Winter v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (citing Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo,
456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982)).
84
Brady I, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 1041–42 (“[T]he public has an interest in the enforcement of the
Sherman Act, which, by seeking to ensure healthy competition in the market, has a broad impact
beyond the immediate parties to this dispute.”).
85
Id. at 1042.
86
Id. (recognizing that the presence of these third parties makes this dispute “far from a purely
private dispute over compensation”); see also Dubois, supra note 4 (discussing the short and long-term
effects an NFL lockout would have on small business owners, including a real possibility that
cancellation of the season would deliver “the final knockout punch” resulting in complete business
shutdowns).
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weighed against the owners; (2) the owners had not made a sufficient
showing that they were likely to succeed on the merits; and (3) the public
interest in considering the ramifications of a lost football season weighed
in favor of denying the motion.87
The NFL appealed the ruling to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit, where on May 2, 2011, a divided 2-1 bench reversed the
district court’s decision and granted the motion for a stay of the
injunction.88 By per curiam opinion, the court reasoned that the NFL had
made a strong showing that it was likely to succeed on the merits of its
claim that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin the lockout under
the Norris-LaGuardia Act89 and the NFL had met its burden to prove that it
would suffer some degree of irreparable harm absent a stay.90
On June 3, 2011, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals submitted the
official opinion that vacated the injunction entirely and remanded the case
to the district court.91 Unlike the previous opinion of the same court that
was submitted per curiam, this decision was written by Judge Steven
Colloton.92 However, it remained a 2-1 decision, with Judge Kermit Bye
writing a lengthy dissent.93 In his opinion, Judge Colloton narrowed his
focus to the Norris-LaGuardia Act itself and its application to the case at
bar. Judge Colloton’s opinion for the court held that: (1) the definition of a
labor dispute under Norris-LaGuardia’s anti-injunction provision did not
require the existence of a union;94 (2) the district court did not have the
authority to enjoin a party to a labor dispute from implementing a
lockout;95 and (3) the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not foreclose an injunction
against the League’s dealings with non-employees (free agents, rookies,
etc.), but that an injunction in that case would have to conform with the
Norris-LaGuardia sections calling for open-court hearings that allow for
cross-examination of witnesses.96
B. The Norris-LaGuardia Act
Before the federal courts’ involvement in the Brady litigation can be
properly analyzed, it is necessary to relate the background and history of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Described as an anti-injunction statute, the

87

Brady II, 779 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1053–54 (D. Minn. 2011).
Brady III, 640 F.3d at 794.
89
Id. at 792.
90
Id. at 794.
91
Brady IV, 644 F.3d at 682.
92
Id. at 663.
93
Id. at 682.
94
Id. at 669–74.
95
Id. at 680–81.
96
Id. at 681–82.
88
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Norris-LaGuardia Act passed through Congress in 1932, signaling a
changing dynamic in labor law.98 The historical stage for the NorrisLaGuardia Act was set by the legal challenges to the Clayton Act, most
notably in the case of Duplex Printing Press Company v. Deering.99 The
Clayton Act, enacted in 1914, was designed to prevent the federal courts
from using the Sherman Act against organized labor.100 Duplex arose
when “unionized machinists organized a strike and boycott against a
company that refused to recognize the union.”101 The issue in this case was
the legality of secondary boycotts.102 The majority refused to make a claim
on absolute rights, and instead ruled against the workers because the
boycott was “sentimental or sympathetic” rather than “proximate and
substantial.”103 The Justices simply did not find a connection between
working conditions at the company that was being boycotted and the
interests of the boycotting workers employed by competing firms in the
business.104 The ruling against workers was yet another example of judges
striking down efforts by organized labor to strengthen workers’ bargaining
positions by labeling them “malicious.”105
It is out of this historical context, one where judges looked to enjoin
the activities of organized labor, that Norris-LaGuardia emerged. The two
principal goals of the Norris-LaGuardia Act were to curtail yellow-dog
contracts and injunctions designed to strike down organized labor
practices.106 Despite the fact that the Norris-LaGuardia Act stripped
federal courts of authority that they had possessed since the formation of
97

29 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
See GEORGE I. LOVELL, LEGISLATIVE DEFERRALS 161 (2003) (discussing how the NorrisLaGuardia Act came out of a difficult era for labor organizations).
99
254 U.S. 443 (1921).
100
Id. at 465.
101
LOVELL, supra note 98, at 59.
102
See Duplex, 254 U.S. at 466 (defining a secondary boycott as “a combination not merely to
refrain from dealing with complainant, or to advise or by peaceful means persuade complainant’s
customers to refrain (‘primary boycott’), but to exercise coercive pressure upon such customers, actual
or prospective, in order to cause them to withhold or withdraw patronage”).
103
Id. at 472 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also LOVELL, supra note 98, at 59.
104
LOVELL, supra note 98, at 59.
105
Id.
106
Id. at 161. Yellow-dog contracts, or those contracts that prohibit employees from becoming a
member of a labor union, are strictly prohibited under Norris LaGuardia, and subsequently under the
laws of every state. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 380-3 (West 2011); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-6-1-3
(West 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:12-2 (West 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-2-4 (West 2011); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 49.32.030 (West 2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 103.52 (West 2011). Case law for the
better part of the early twentieth century came out against labor organizations and workers on the issue
of yellow-dog contracts, as courts were reluctant to side against big businesses. See Hitchman Coal &
Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917) (making yellow-dog contracts more of a tool for employers
to resist unions); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (striking down a state law provision similar to
the one in Adair v. United States); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (rejecting the idea that
the legislature could make law to protect labor organizations).
98
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the judicial system, there were very few constitutional challenges107 and,
even more surprisingly, judges were quick to uphold the limits placed on
their jurisdiction.108
The section of the Norris-LaGuardia Act most relevant to this
comment is the section that places limits on the ability of a court to issue
an injunction. Section 7 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act states: “No court of
the United States shall have the jurisdiction to issue a temporary or
permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of a labor
dispute” until a certain set of procedural and substantive restrictions are
met.109
What is most important about the Norris-LaGuardia Act is that it was
Congress’s response to years of big business abuse of labor organizations
and judicial complicity in that abuse. When Congress makes it difficult to
enjoin labor disputes, the petitioners asking for injunction are almost
always the employers who want their employees to stop striking and
boycotting their businesses. That understanding speaks directly to
congressional intent, as it is reasonable to assume that Congress intended
for the Norris-LaGuardia Act to deal with cases where employees have
stopped working and have either gone on strike or staged an actual boycott,
and that the party asking for an injunction would be the actual target of the
strike. What Congress was worried about in drafting the Norris-LaGuardia
Act was violence and damage to property, and the party asking for an
injunction in those cases was almost always the target of the strike or
boycott. Norris-LaGuardia did not leave a loophole for violent strikes, but
in such cases, the complainants had an established five-part test to pass to
determine whether or not an injunction was absolutely necessary.110
For “Norris-LaGuardia to succeed where the Clayton Act had failed,
the courts had to do more than adopt a broader interpretation of what
activities were immunized. . . . [T]he courts also had to find that the
107
See LOVELL, supra note 98, at 171–72 (stating that there were very few constitutional
challenges to the yellow-dog contract language and that the constitutional challenges to the jurisdiction
of the courts failed).
108
Id. at 172 (“Even justices who were openly hostile to labor quickly dismissed constitutional
challenges to Congress’s power to place limits on court jurisdiction.”); see also id. (citing lower level
cases such as Knapp-Monarch Co. v. Anderson, et al., 7 F. Supp. 322, (E.D. Ill. 1934), Cinderella
Theater Co., Inc. v. Sign Writers’ Local Union No. 591, 6 F. Supp. 164 (E.D. Mich. 1934), and
Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 71 F.2d 284 (2d Cir. 1934), as well as Supreme Court cases Senn
v. Tile Layers Protective Unions, 301 U.S. 468 (1937) and Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 301 U.S. 315
(1938)).
109
Id. at 179 (noting that an injunction may not be issued until a judge has held an open,
adversarial hearing to make the necessary findings of fact).
110
Id. at 181 (discussing the idea that injunctions in labor disputes were not impossible, especially
in cases where violence had occurred, but that judges still had to go through the finding of fact process
to make such a determination); see also id. (citing Lauf v. Shinner, 303 U.S. 315 (1938) (reprimanding
a lower court for failing to make the necessitated findings of fact in a case where violence grew out of a
labor dispute).
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immunities covered a much broader range of persons.”
Essentially,
judicial attitudes needed to change before Norris-LaGuardia could be a
success. To put it bluntly, judges needed to take a hands-off approach to
labor disputes in order to accomplish the purpose of Norris-LaGuardia.
Further, “[t]he Norris-LaGuardia provisions were more successful than the
corresponding provisions in the Clayton Act in part because judges often
ruled that Norris-LaGuardia’s immunities applied to a broader range of
persons.”112
A clear example of this shift in favor of a hands-off approach to labor
disputes is the case of Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union.113 In Senn, a
tiling contractor requested an injunction to prevent a union of tile layers
from picketing outside his business.114 The objective of the picketing was
to force Senn to become a union contractor and to enter into an agreement
under which he was to hire union men.115 When Senn refused to sign the
agreement, the union116 peacefully and lawfully picketed his place of
business.117 The situation at bar was similar to the one in Duplex Printing
v. Deering,118 where the picketers were not seeking employment with the
company they were targeting. However, while the Court in Duplex issued
an injunction, the Court in Senn ruled that the lower court could not issue
an injunction.119 The Supreme Court’s opinion in Senn reflected a
newfound laissez-faire mentality with regard to shared interests among
workers at different firms who happen to be involved in the same
industry.120
The outcome in Senn shows that we owe much of the success of
Norris-LaGuardia to the differences in language between this Act and the
Clayton Act, especially with respect to who is and who is not protected.
Section 20 of the Clayton Act lacked clear references to who was and who
was not protected, while the Norris-LaGuardia Act has a section devoted to
defining cases that “grow[] out of a labor dispute.”121 Section 13 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act defines such cases as those involving “persons who
are engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation; or have direct
or indirect interests therein; or who are employees of the same employer;
111

111

Id. at 200.
Id.
113
301 U.S. 468 (1937).
114
Id. at 473.
115
Id. at 474.
116
It is important to recognize that the union members picketing Senn’s business were not
employed by Senn nor were they seeking any employment at his business. LOVELL, supra note 98, at
201.
117
Senn, 301 U.S. at 474–75.
118
254 U.S. 443 (1921).
119
LOVELL, supra note 98, at 201.
120
Id.
121
Norris-Laguardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
112

1034

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:1017

or who are members of the same or an affiliated organization of employers
or employees.”122 This language as to who or what is involved in “a labor
dispute” seems to encompass just about every possibility conceivable by
the drafters. The success of Norris-LaGuardia is due to this allencompassing language, as judges could now overturn weak case law
without controversy.
The Supreme Court went even further in crafting a working definition
for the term “labor dispute” in deciding the case of New Negro Alliance v.
Sanitary Grocery Company.123 In New Negro Alliance, the petitioners
were an organization composed of African-Americans that sought
workplace improvements for its members as well as “the promotion of
civic, educational, benevolent, and charitable enterprises.”124
The
respondent in the case was a corporation operating 255 grocery stores and
employing members of both races.125 There was no employer-employee
relationship between the parties.126 As in Senn, the protesters also had no
interest in being employed by the respondent or by any other grocery
store.127 In his majority opinion, Justice Roberts wrote: “We think the
conclusion that the dispute was not a labor dispute within the meaning of
the Act, because it did not involve terms and conditions of employment in
the sense of wages, hours, unionization or betterment of working
conditions is erroneous.”128
Because there was no direct employer-employee relationship between
the two parties, the Court applied other, lesser-known portions of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act to establish that the case grew out of a labor dispute.
Justice Roberts followed the language of Section 13 to draw this
conclusion, specifically that a labor dispute need not require a dispute
between employers and employees.129 Justice Roberts quoted subsections
(a) and (b),130 but it is the language of subsection (c) that is most notable.
Justice Roberts wrote that a labor dispute includes “‘any controversy
concerning terms or conditions of employment, . . . regardless of whether
or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and
employee.’”131
122

LOVELL, supra note 98, at 201.
303 U.S. 552 (1938).
124
Id. at 555.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
See id. (discussing the fact that the petitioners were not competitors working in the same line
of business as the respondent); see also LOVELL, supra note 98, at 201 n.60 (“This time, the ruling
came even though none of the protesters were employed or interested in being employed at the store or
at any other grocery store.”).
128
New Negro Alliance, 303 U.S. at 559–60.
129
Id. at 560–61.
130
Id. at 560.
131
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1934)).
123
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V. WHY THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT WAS WRONG
As the Eighth Circuit incorrectly applied the framework established in
Part I of this Comment132 and the Norris-LaGuardia Act,133 the court in
Brady was incorrect in holding that the owners’ lockout of the players
could not be enjoined. The Eighth Circuit’s decision was incorrect for the
following reasons: (1) the NFL was unlikely to succeed on the merits of its
claim that the district court lacked jurisdiction under the Norris-LaGuardia
Act to enjoin the lockout; (2) the NFL had not met its burden to
demonstrate that it would suffer irreparable harm absent a stay; and (3)
public policy favored the players’ position as to whether or not an
injunction should have been issued.
When analyzing whether or not a stay should be issued, a circuit court
of appeals is attempting to decide whether or not it should intrude on the
decision made by a district court—in this case, the issuance of an
injunction.134 A stay is defined as “an intrusion into the ordinary processes
of administration and judicial review, . . . and accordingly is not a matter of
right, even if irreparable injury might otherwise result to the appellant.”135
A. The NFL Was Unlikely to Succeed on the Merits of Its Claim That the
District Court Lacked Jurisdiction Under the Norris-LaGuardia Act
The NFL was unlikely to succeed on the merits of its claim that a
federal court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin a lockout in large part due to the
principal purpose behind the Norris-LaGuardia Act. As was previously
discussed, the rationale behind the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
was to protect labor organizations, which had very little protection, from
exposure to the injunction power of the federal courts.136 Judge Bye made
reference to the Duplex case in his dissent, noting that “the Court refused
to extend a similar anti-injunction provision in the Clayton Act to
secondary activity—i.e., activity where union pressure is directed against
third parties rather than the employees’ own employer.”137 However, the
language of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is broad and more encompassing for
a reason, and that reason was so that more labor activities could be
shielded from federal court involvement.138
132

See supra Part I.
29 U.S.C. § 101 (2006); see also supra Part IV.B.
134
See supra Part IV.A.
135
Brady III, 640 F.3d at 794 (Bye, J., dissenting) (quoting Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1757
(2009)).
136
See supra Part III.B.
137
Brady III, 640 F.3d at 797 (Bye, J., dissenting) (citing Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of
Maint. of Way Emps., 481 U.S. 429, 438 (1987)).
138
See supra notes 113–28 and accompanying text (discussing how the Senn and New Negro
Alliance cases applied the Norris LaGuardia Act to a larger class of citizens and activities).
133
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When analyzing congressional intent in the enactment of the NorrisLaGuardia Act, Judge Bye noted that “Congress took care to greatly
broaden . . . the meaning . . . attributed to the words labor dispute,”139 and
that Congress emphasized “the public importance under modern economic
conditions of protecting the rights of employees to organize into unions
and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”140 The case law under the
Norris-LaGuardia Act strongly supports the proposition that the intent of
the Act’s drafters was to protect workers and those who were picketing in
support of workers’ interests,141 and not to protect big business employers
from locking out their employees.
The Norris-LaGuardia Act was enacted to protect the collective
bargaining process.142 It is with that understanding that we revisit the
discussion of the early cases involving the NFL and its players. Judge Bye
cited to the Powell case, recognizing that “[u]nless the values of collective
bargaining are implicated, federal labor laws yield to the regular antitrust
framework.”143 In Powell, the Eighth Circuit declined to set the limits on
what qualifies as “involving or growing out of a labor dispute,” but the
Court did hold that a bargaining impasse was not enough to preclude the
application of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.144 As long as there is ongoing
collective bargaining, courts have been reluctant to deny the applicability
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.145
The situation at bar in Brady, however, is inapposite to cases such as
Powell. The players (read: employees) disclaimed the role of the NFLPA
as their representative in any collective bargaining. 146 The players
decertified the union in a vote to end its status as their legal
139
Brady III, 640 F.3d at 797 (Bye, J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (quoting Allen Bradley
Co. v. Local Union No. 3, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797, 805 (1945)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
140
Id.; see also Local Union No. 189 v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 703 n.4 (1965) (“[T]o
protect the rights of labor . . . .”).
141
See, e.g., Senn, 301 U.S. at 470 (protecting the right to picket even though the picketers were
not seeking employment with that business); see also New Negro Alliance, 303 U.S. at 560 (citing
subsection (c) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, defining the term “labor dispute” as including “any
controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, . . . regardless of whether or not the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee” (alteration in original) (quoting
29 U.S.C. § 113 (1934))).
142
Brady III, 640 F.3d at 798 (Bye, J., dissenting) (“[T]he law remains focused on safeguarding
the collective bargaining process.”).
143
Id. (citing Powell, 930 F.2d at 1303).
144
See Powell, 690 F. Supp. at 815 (“[W]here the bargaining relationship and the collective
bargaining process remains intact, a controversy regarding terms or conditions of employment
constitutes a labor dispute.”).
145
See id. (“The current controversy surrounding the free agency issue constitutes a ‘labor
dispute’ as contemplated by the Norris-LaGuardia Act.”).
146
See supra Part II.
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147

representative.
This action taken by the players is perhaps the most
significant action taken in the entire litigation, as their vote to strip the
union of its power to represent them in their capacity as employees brings
collective bargaining to a definitive halt.148 Decertification of the union
ends the collective bargaining process because the union is no longer the
representative of the players, and also triggers the opportunity to bring
antitrust litigation under the Sherman Act.149
Judge Bye found the solution to this issue in the Brown litigation, most
notably in the Supreme Court decision of Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.150 In
Brown, although the Court was dealing with the nonstatutory labor
exemption, and although the Court came out on the side of the employer,151
there is much to be learned from the opinion. The Court in Brown
discussed the existence of “an agreement among employers [that] could be
sufficiently distant in time and in circumstances from the collectivebargaining process that a rule permitting antitrust intervention would not
significantly interfere with that process.”152 The Court then cited examples
of “sufficiently distant” events, one of which being a “collapse of the
collective-bargaining relationship, as evidenced by decertification of the
union.”153 Judge Bye understood the situation as one where the players
have no association to a union, and have thus chosen to pursue their
interests under the antitrust law instead of remaining under the protection
of labor law.154 Because the players do not fall under the framework of
American labor law, the Norris-LaGuardia Act should not have been
triggered, thus allowing an injunction to be issued against the lockout in
this case.
In assessing the application of Norris-LaGuardia to the case at bar,
Judge Bye distinguished between the majority’s use of the New Negro
Alliance case and the proper reading of the case.155 The majority of the
Eighth Circuit (Judges Colloton and Benton), incorrectly cited New Negro
147

Id.
Phillip Lawrence Wright, Jr., Major League Soccer: Antitrust, the Single Entity, and the
Heightened Demand for a Labor Movement in the New Professional Soccer League, 10 SETON HALL J.
SPORT L. 357, 386 (2000).
149
Id.
150
518 U.S. 231 (1996).
151
Brady III, 640 F.3d at 798 (Bye, J., dissenting).
152
Brown, 518 U.S. at 250.
153
Id. Ostensibly, employees can avoid the application of labor laws that preclude federal court
involvement by decertifying the union that represented them. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d
1041, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1995), aff’d, 518 U.S. 231 (1996) (“If employees wish to seek the protections of
the Sherman Act, they may forego unionization or even decertify their unions.”); see also Nat’l
Basketball Ass’n v. Williams, 857 F. Supp. 1069, 1078 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff’d, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir.
1995) (recognizing that the players can avoid a labor injunction if they disclaim the players’ union as a
collective bargaining agent).
154
Brady III, 640 F.3d at 799 (Bye, J., dissenting) (citing Brown, 50 F.3d at 1057).
155
New Negro Alliance, 303 U.S. at 552.
148
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Alliance to stay the injunction under the proposition that there need not be
a labor union for the Norris-LaGuardia Act to apply.156 Further, the
majority held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act embraces controversies
whether they are between employers and employees, labor unions
representing employees and employers, or even persons seeking
employment and employers.157 While New Negro Alliance certainly
provides support for a broad reading of “labor dispute,” the problem with
the application of its holding to this case is that it did not address the
question as to whether or not the Norris-LaGuardia Act applies after the
decertification of a union.158
In New Negro Alliance, the Court made a determination that, even
though the picketers were not asserting economic interests that most often
are implicated in labor disputes, such as working conditions, wages, or
hours, the controversy arose out of a labor dispute, thus triggering the
application of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.159 It is, in fact, immaterial that
the primary concern was not economic, but instead political or social in
nature, and Norris-LaGuardia should have thus applied to preclude federal
court involvement.160
The Court in Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v. International Longshore
Men’s Association161 went even further, discussing the intent behind the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, laying the groundwork for Judge Bye’s argument.
Following the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1980, an affiliate
of the International Longshoremen’s Association refused to load three
ships bound for the Soviet Union with superphosphoric acid.162 The
employer sought an injunction under the argument that Norris-LaGuardia
only protects labor disputes, that labor disputes only exist when a union
acts in economic self-interest, and that in this case the primary motivation
was political, rather than economic.163 The Court, however, reiterated that
the critical test of Norris-LaGuardia application is whether or not “the
employer-employee relationship [is] the matrix of the controversy.” 164
156
See Brady III, 640 F.3d at 791 (recognizing that no labor union was involved in New Negro
Alliance); see also id. (“[T]he Act plainly embrace[s] the controversy which gave rise to the instant suit
and classif[ies] it as one arising out of a dispute defined as a labor dispute.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
157
See id. (citing New Negro Alliance, 303 U.S. at 560–61).
158
Id. at 799 (Bye, J., dissenting).
159
Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. Int’l Longshore Men’s Ass’n, 457 U.S. 702, 714 (1982).
160
Id. at 714–15 (“The Act does not concern itself with the background or the motives of the
dispute.” (quoting New Negro Alliance, 303 U.S. at 561)).
161
457 U.S. 702 (1982).
162
Id. at 704–05 (notably, superphosphoric acid was not included in President Carter’s embargo
restricting certain trade with the Soviet Union).
163
Id. at 713.
164
Id. at 712–13 (alteration in original) (quoting Columbia River Packers Ass’n v. Hinton, 315
U.S. 143, 147 (1942)).

2013]

LET THEM TRAIN

1039

Further, the Court cited New Negro Alliance for the proposition that
noneconomic motives do not render Norris-LaGuardia inapplicable.165
In holding Norris-LaGuarida applicable because this dispute deals with
the employees’ obligation to provide labor the employer, the Court
reasoned, “[t]he Act was enacted in response to federal-court intervention
on behalf of employers through the use of injunctive powers against unions
and other associations of employees.”166 As such, it was not Congress’s
intent to pass Norris-LaGuardia in order to protect employers from having
injunctions instituted against a lockout of employees. Instead, NorrisLaGuardia was passed to strengthen labor laws so that employees could
unionize and not have to worry about courts striking down their organized
actions.
The New Negro Alliance opinion makes no mention of how NorrisLaGuardia should be applied if the collective bargaining process has been
abandoned,167 and thus the Court is not bound by any holding that
unionized action is covered by the Norris-LaGuardia Act. New Negro
Alliance does not recognize the process of collective bargaining, leaving
open the dangerous possibility for all employment discrimination cases to
come under federal law.168
B. The NFL Did Not Meet Its Burden of Demonstrating That It Would
Suffer Irreparable Harm Absent a Stay
Another objection to issuing a stay discussed in Judge Bye’s dissent is
that the NFL owners did not meet the burden of proving that they would
suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a stay. Anyone interested in
obtaining a stay has to “show a threat of irreparable harm.”169 An inability
to show that irreparable harm is likely to occur is enough to warrant a
denial of the motion to stay.170 In his dissent, Judge Bye clearly laid out
the test for whether or not a stay should be granted.171 For a stay to be
granted, the irreparable harm must threaten the very existence of the
petitioner’s business,172 in this case the NFL itself.
165

Id. at 714.
Id. at 715.
167
Brady III, 640 F.3d at 800. See generally New Negro Alliance, 303 U.S. at 552 (holding that
non-economic protest is protected by the Norris-LaGuardia Act).
168
Brady III, 640 F.3d at 800 (citing Stearns v. NCR Corp., 297 F.3d 706, 710 (8th Cir. 2002), for
the proposition that employment contracts between employers and non-union employees are generally
governed by state law and not federal labor law).
169
Rogers Grp., Inc. v. City of Fayetteville, Ark., 629 F.3d 784, 789 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Gen.
Motors Corp. v. Harry Brown’s, LLC, 563 F.3d 312, 318 (8th Cir. 2009)).
170
Id.
171
See Brady III, 640 F.3d at 794–95 (Bye, J., dissenting) (stating that a party must show certain
harm of an imminence as to require present equitable relief, that the harm must be actual and not
theoretical, and that economic loss in itself does not constitute irreparable harm).
172
Packard Elevator v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 782 F.2d 112, 115 (8th Cir. 1986).
166
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The first argument the NFL made is that allowing the injunction to
stand deprives the owners of their labor law right to lock the players out,
which in turn would skew the collective bargaining process in favor of the
players.173 As discussed earlier, the idea that the NFL has the labor law
right to lock out the players is misplaced. The players are not currently
members of a union, having decertified it early in the process, and are thus
not currently engaged in the process of collective bargaining.174 If the
players no longer fall under the protection of federal labor law, then it
follows that their employers, the owners, should be precluded from using
federal labor laws against them. In any case, the injury that the NFL
claimed it will suffer is a loss of that bargaining power, but because there
is no ongoing collective bargaining process, any claim that the owners will
suffer irreparable harm due to loss of bargaining power is moot.175
The NFL’s second argument that irreparable harm will occur absent a
stay was that it will be impossible to go back to the status quo with respect
to player movement if a stay were not granted.176 As the district court
described it, the NFL’s argument centered on the idea that not staying the
injunction would—after giving the players a leg up in the collective
bargaining process—force the owners to give into demands for unrestricted
free agency, thus exposing the NFL and its owners to antitrust challenges
simply for trying to make their product desirable.177 The problem with this
argument is that the court is not ordering the NFL to do anything that the
owners say they would have to do absent a stay. Nothing about the
injunction makes anything court-mandated. The district court opinion
held, “[l]ike any defendant in any lawsuit, Defendants themselves must
make a decision about how to proceed and accept the consequences of their
decision.”178
Although unrestricted free agency and the lack of a salary cap are two
different practices, they are both sought by players as a means to higher
pay. They are also both resisted by owners, as both of those ideas shift the
competitive balance in favor of the higher-spending, major-market teams.
In 2010, the last season to operate without a salary cap, the two teams that
played in the Super Bowl were the Pittsburgh Steelers and the Green Bay
Packers, two small-market teams.179 It was not teams such as the New
173

Brady III, 640 F.3d at 795 (Bye, J., dissenting).
See supra notes 57–62 and accompanying text.
175
Brady III, 640 F.3d at 795 (Bye, J., dissenting).
176
Id. at 793.
177
Brady II, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 1049 (“[A]bsent a stay, its clubs’ possible agreements to common
terms and conditions of player employment would expose the NFL and the member clubs to antitrust
challenge for . . . respond[ing] to consumer demand.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
178
Id.
179
See Patrick Rishe, Fox Will Score Ratings Touchdown with Steelers-Packers Super Bowl,
FORBES (Jan. 24, 2011, 12:35 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/sportsmoney/2011/01/24/fox-will174
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York Jets, New York Giants, New England Patriots, or Dallas Cowboys.
Thus, the argument that there would be irreparable harm to the League’s
competitive balance absent a stay of the injunction (which would assume
higher spending from the big-market teams) is immaterial. Not only can
the owners themselves decide how they want to proceed, meaning they do
not have to support unrestricted free agency, but even if they did, the
competitive balance of the League is not likely to shift any more than it
does in a given year.
The argument that there will be irreparable harm to the owners absent a
stay pales in comparison to the much more substantial reality of the
irreparable harm the players would suffer in the event of a stay if the
injunction was granted.180 The most significant consequence of the stay is
that it keeps players out of their team facilities. As Judge Bye discussed in
his dissent, even the briefest of stays would deprive the players of precious
opportunities to “develop their skills . . . and to otherwise advance their
NFL careers.”181 A prolonged lockout, the product of a “stay,” would
prohibit the most vulnerable of the NFL’s employees, the rookies, from
having any kind of opportunity.182 The owner-imposed stoppage leaves the
rookies with no opportunity to practice with their team or access their
team’s game plan and coaching staff, leaving them with even less of a
chance than otherwise to make the team.183
In addition, there are dangers of a stay for veteran players, who rely on
being able to engage in certain activities at their team’s facility each
offseason in order to maintain not only their level of play but also their
viability.184 Long term, the inability to engage in a team’s offseason
program could have major ramifications for veteran players and rookies
alike. Perhaps most importantly, the lasting effect cannot adequately be
measured in monetary damages. A lost season, which a lockout could very
easily lead to, can be devastating in a sport where the average career length
of a player is no more than five years.185 In such a competitive field,
score-ratings-touchdown-with-steelers-packers-super-bowl/ (referring to the Green Bay Packers and
Pittsburgh Steelers as “members of small-market, blue-collar communities”).
180
In order to intelligently analyze these events more closely, one has to take a step back and
think of the consequences of the injunction being stayed. A stay on the injunction allows the lockout to
continue, thus precluding players from associating themselves in any way with their teams.
181
Brady III, 640 F.3d at 796 (Bye, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
182
Id.
183
Id.; see also Neeld v. Am. Hockey League, 439 F. Supp. 459, 461 (W.D.N.Y. 1977) (“A young
athlete’s skills diminish and sometimes are irretrievably lost unless he is given an opportunity to
practice and refine such skills at a certain level of proficiency.”).
184
See Brady III, 640 F.3d at 796 (Bye, J., dissenting) (listing valuable events including, but not
limited to, classroom sessions, club evaluations, medical procedures, etc., that would be lost if the
lockout was allowed to continue).
185
The Average NFL Player, supra note 1 (stating that the average career span of NFL players is
3.5 years).
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players constantly have to prove their value, and the inability to prove that
value for an entire season cannot be recaptured, not even by compensatory
damages.186 Because no irreparable harm is likely to be experienced by
owners, and because whatever harm they are likely to incur is clearly
outweighed by the irreparable harm that could be suffered by the players,
the NFL has a heavier burden to show that it is likely to prevail on the
merits.187 As I have already demonstrated that the NFL’s argument that
Norris-LaGuardia applies was unpersuasive,188 it is fair to say that the NFL
did not sustain its burden.
C. The Public Interest Weighs in Favor of the Players
Perhaps most widely important, the public interest as to whether or not
a stay of the injunction should be granted weighs in favor of the players.
Again, to assess the public interest, we need to take note of what a stay of
the injunction would mean. A stay of the injunction keeps the players out
of their teams’ facilities and hurts their opportunities to gain employment
in the future by cutting off an entire offseason of training.189 To gain an
understanding of the public interest implications of a stay, we are forced to
comprehend that allowing the lockout to stand forces apart the two sides
even more, further hurting the chances that the two sides will reconcile and
save the season. The public interest becomes a factor when we realize the
possibility of a lost season and analyze the implications it might have for
non-parties, including stadium vendors, restaurant owners, and society in
general.
In his dissent, Judge Bye wrote, “At best, when considering the public
interest in having a 2011 NFL season and, by extension, continuing with
normal operations necessary for that objective, the public interest factor is
a wash.”190 In Judge Bye’s view, the players should have won
notwithstanding any public interest issue. I question his judgment here, as
I fear he does not fully understand what we mean by the “public interest.”
What I fear most is that Judge Bye and the majority are thinking about
public interest solely in terms of how the public will be affected by not
having a 2011 NFL season, how much money is tied up in an NFL season,
and how many people will lose their ability to earn a salary because their
186
Brady I, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 1036 (“[T]ime spent off the playing and practice fields diminishes
players’ skills. In the course of sitting out a season, this diminishment in skills could shorten or end the
careers of some players.” (citations omitted)).
187
Brady III, 640 F.3d at 796–97 (Bye, J., dissenting); see Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc.,
640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981) (“If the chance of irreparable injury to the movant should relief be
denied is outweighed by the likely injury to other parties litigant should the injunction be granted, the
moving party faces a heavy burden of demonstrating that he is likely to prevail on the merits.”).
188
See supra Part IV.A.
189
That reasoning is not public interest reasoning, and is more party-focused.
190
Brady III, 640 F.3d at 800 (Bye, J., dissenting).
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jobs depend on the NFL going about its daily business.
While Judge Bye likely did not want to be swayed by sympathetic
stories of stadium workers who will lose their jobs and neighborhood bar
owners who will lose a major money-making business, the stories do
reflect the people whose livelihoods depend on an NFL season. Judge Bye
is incorrect in saying that the public interest can be seen as a wash. Not
only are we talking about major losses for these employees who are nonparties as the result of a season-long lockout, but there are also public legal
interests that are at stake if the injunction is stayed.
As the district court pointed out in its opinion, the NFL is lobbying that
the public interest lies in encouraging collective bargaining between the
two parties, and the imposition of a lockout under labor law is one way
they are attempting to encourage that process.191 The problem with the
NFL’s logic here is that the players have decertified the union and are no
longer engaged in collective bargaining.192 The NFL’s opt-out of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement in May 2008 and subsequent failure to
renegotiate should have hamstrung the League and restrained it from
imposing a lockout under traditional labor laws.193 The public interest is in
fact served best by not allowing the NFL to seek protection under labor
law while the players are unable “to enjoy their corresponding rights of
collective bargaining and the right to strike.”194 At its very core, it is a
slippery slope argument. We must not allow a group of employers to use
labor laws to protect themselves when both the union has been disclaimed
and the group of employees is not protected by labor laws themselves.
VI. CONCLUSION
Labor law in general is about allowing less powerful groups of people
to come together and engage in collective bargaining to protect themselves
against more powerful employers. The problems that arose between the
NFL and its players in the early twenty-first century may have been fought
over billions of dollars, where even the losers were making millions of
dollars, but we cannot lose sight of the implications that laws have on all
classes of society. Those who make up the lower class, the janitors, the
food service employees, and the maintenance workers who make $12,000 a
year come under the same labor laws as NFL players who make upwards
of $10,000,000 a year in many cases. It is thus our duty to enforce labor
laws and to respect the limits of labor law to ensure that all classes of
191
Brady II, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 1053 (“[T]he NFL contends that the public interest in encouraging
the collective bargaining process would be well-served by issuing a stay pending expedited appellate
review.”).
192
Id.
193
Id.
194
Id.
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workers are treated fairly.
It might not have looked so bad from a public-relations standpoint to
keep the players out of their facilities for an extended period of time, when
in reality the NFL should not have successfully avoided the issuance of an
injunction under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, but we have to imagine what it
would have looked like to keep a lower class of workers out of their
offices, to keep a lower class from earning enough to support their
families. We are not only talking about million dollar athletes. The same
laws that protect those athletes protect the workers who hold this country
together. The Norris-LaGuardia Act was passed to deprive federal courts
of the authority to stop those workers from picketing and attempting to
improve their situations. It was not passed as a tool for employers to hide
behind. The Eighth Circuit was wrong in granting the stay and vacating
the injunction because it lost sight of the true meaning of labor law in this
country: to protect those who cannot protect themselves.

